MS # P-041d

THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF

by

Franz HALDER, Generaloberst a.D.

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Historical Division
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
1952

The Author

Franz HALDER, Generaloberst
Date of Birth: 30 June 1884
Place of Birth: Wuerzburg, Germany

From training in the Royal Bavarian Officer Candidate School, the Royal Bavarian Artillery School, and the Royal Bavarian War College, HALDER throughout World War I served on various staffs from division to army group level.

From 1936 until 1938 he held high assignments in Army High Command. After a brief tour as Chief of Operations Staff, he was appointed Chief of Army General Staff on 27 August 1938 when Generaloberst Ludwig BECK resigned from that position in protest against Hitler's obvious intention to wage war. In the same year he was promoted from Generalleutnant to General der Artillerie and in 1940 to Generaloberst.

Owing to continuous differences of opinion on matters of strategy and ethics, and because of alleged obstructionism, Hitler removed Generaloberst HALDER from his post as Chief of Army General Staff in September 1942 and placed him in the Army High Command Officer Reserve.

On 21 July 1944, the day after the attempt on Hitler's life, HALDER was arrested by the Gestapo and spent the rest of the war in various prisons and concentration camps. While held in custody HALDER was retired from the Army on 31 January 1945.

THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF

In the 100,000-man Army the General Staff work which cannot be dispensed with in any army (home defense, intelligence, organization, training) was done in the "Troop Office" of the Reichswehr Ministry. It was headed by the Chief of the Troop Office. In connection with the reintroduction of general liability for military service and the Reich Government's proclamation announcing the expansion of the Army, the Chief of the Troop Office, at that time General der Artillerie Ludwig Beck, assumed the title "Chief of the Army General Staff" without any essential change in his functions. Logically, this title was in line with sub-titles as "Chief of Headquarters of Army Corps General Staff" and "Chief of Army Headquarters General Staff". In spite of this, the choice of title was not a very fortunate one. In the mind of the public both at home and abroad, the title "Chief of the Army General Staff" was bound to the memory of the decisive importance of former, famous holders of this position, such as von Moltke and Count Schlieffen. However, the nature of the agency in the Army High Command, which was designated "Chief of the Army General Staff" after 1936, was completely different to the nature of the agency in the Imperial Army. In the latter case the Chief of Army General Staff was on a level with the Minister of War and reported directly to the Crown. While the Minister was responsible to parliament as a Cabinet officer, the former was responsible solely to the Crown as commander in chief. In contrast, the Chief of Army General Staff, coming from the Troop Office, was an agent of the Commander in Chief of the Army who again, without the functions of a minister, was subordinate to the Commander in

Chief of the Wehrmacht and the Minister of War Werner von Blomberg.

The Chief of the Army General Staff in peacetime was on a level with the Chief of the General Army Office, Army Ordnance Office, the Personnel Office and the other office chiefs immediately subordinate to the Commander in Chief of the Army and as primus inter pares was responsible only to him. In the absence of the Commander in Chief of the Army, the Chief of the Army General Staff was his representative in matters concerning the routine of the office. Service regulations placed on him three major tasks:

1. To make all necessary suggestions to the Commander in Chief of the Army that enabled the Army to accomplish its mission, the protection of German territory.

2. To secure execution of decisions and orders from the Commander in Chief of the Army, insofar as they touched the sphere of activity of the General Staff.

3. To train and educate the Army General Staff for its tasks.

The organization of the Chief of the Army General Staff, designated as "general staff" in the Army High Command, comprised, in peacetime and approximately to the end of 1938, twelve numbered branches and, in addition, the Central Branch and the Attache Branch, a total of fourteen branches. These branches are listed in Chart 1.

To aid in the direction of the extensive work, the Chief of the Army General Staff was assisted by a varying number of assistant chiefs of staff. According to the needs of the moment, several General Staff branches were grouped under their command. Just prior to the war there were five assistant chiefs of staff in the Army High Command.

Assistant Chief of Staff I was the permanent representative of the Chief of the General Staff and had under his command Branches 1, 9 and 10 and, temporarily, also Branches 5 and 6. His field of activity was home defense.

Assistant Chief of Staff II directed General Staff work in the field of training. Under him were Branches 4 and 11 and, temporarily, also Branch 7.

Assistant Chief of Staff III was in charge of Branches 5 and 6 (Supply and Transportation) in 1937-1938, of Branches 2 and 8 (Organization and Technology) in 1938-1939.

The Office of Assistant Chief of Staff III, by a reorganization of Branch 8, was to have been an agency to represent the requirements of the strategic and tactical conduct of operations on behalf of the Chief of the General Staff with respect to technology and to secure the exploitation of technical progress to enhance the striking power of the Army. The development of the branch in this sense was prevented by the outbreak of war.

Assistant Chief of Staff IV directed the evaluation of intelligence on foreign armies and the meetings with their representatives. He supervised Branches 3 and 12 and the Attache Branch.

Assistant Chief of Staff V directed the military-scientific tasks of the General Staff. Prior to the war, he supervised Branch 7 and the Chief of Army Libraries, and, as separate agencies, the Chief of Army Archives and the Military History Research Institute of the Army. The organization of branches for military history, one for ancient military history and one for modern military history was under consideration.

For the coordination of several General Staff branches interested in the same problem, the branch chief working on the problem was responsible. The assistant chief of staff controlled the teamwork within the General Staff branches for the Chief of the General Staff.

Cooperation with the other offices of the Army High Command was on a par with that in other major government offices. Contact with the Wehrmacht High Command was restricted to questions of competence concerning home defense, organization, intelligence on foreign armies, questions concerning transport and communications. The same was true of contacts with the commanders in chief of the Luftwaffe and the Navy. Contact with the civilian authorities, in the main, existed only with the Ministry of the Interior (surveying and cartography).

There was no official connection with the Foreign Office. All military-political matters were handled with final responsibility by the Wehrmacht High Command and direct contact between the Foreign Office and the General Staff was absolutely forbidden by the highest authority.

The Chief of the General Staff, personally, reported on all fundamental questions to the Commander in Chief of the Army after the General Staff branch handling these questions had cleared them with all other branches and offices concerned. Written reports, prepared in most cases by the branch chief concerned or by the respective assistant chief of staff on questions which had been completely cleared, were submitted to the Commander in Chief after permission to do so had been given by the Chief of the General Staff.

With the outbreak of war, the changes prepared according to the

mobilization plan were made in the organization of the General Staff of the Army High Command. The main body of the General Staff was organized as "Headquarters of the Army High Command" as a field command agency, The elements not immediately necessary for the direction of the Field Army remained in Berlin under the control of Assistant Chief of Staff V, but were administratively linked to the Commander of the Replacement Army. In matters concerning their work they remained under the Chief of the Army General Staff. Details are given in Chart 2.

The Chief of the Army General Staff commanded the "Headquarters of the Army High Command" which was at the disposal of the Commander in Chief of the Army as the operations staff of the Field Army. All members of the Headquarters of the Army High Command were under his disciplinary control. He was responsible to the Commander in Chief of the Army for the smooth functioning of the field command agency in line with the decisions of the Commander in Chief of the Army. In addition to suggestions for the operation, organization, and training of the Field Army, it was his task to furnish and clear all the data necessary for a decision and to secure its swift execution by the offices under the field command agency.

Once the mobilization had started the "Manual for General Staff Service in Wartime" also applied to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army (Army Regulation No 92, Confidential). The principles in this regulation, governing obligatory consultation in all operations and in all matters directly connected to operations, and the right of making suggestions in fields not immediately connected to operations, were applicable even in the relations between the Chief of the General Staff and the Commander in

Chief of the Army. In reality, a division of work was accomplished between the Commander in Chief of the Army and the Chief of the General Staff.

The Chief of the General Staff directed operations for the Commander in Chief of the Army. All essential questions were reported to the Commander in Chief of the Army for his decision. Basic operational orders were signed by the Chief of the General Staff in his capacity as the superior of the army group and army commanders. The fields of organization and training, which cannot be separated from the conduct of operations, were likewise controlled by the Chief of the General Staff. All fundamental questions were submitted to the Commander in Chief of the Army for his decision. All fundamental orders were signed by him.

The requirements necessary for the maintenance of the Army in its war strength, for its reinforcement, organizational changes and technical equipment according to the military situation were submitted by the Chief of the General Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army who made the decisions regarding them and saw that they were met by the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Training Army.

The Commander in Chief of the Army personally directed the following spheres of activity:

1. The training of the officers corps; promotions and decorations handled by the Army Personnel Office.

2. Morale and discipline in the Army: handled at first by the Army Affairs Branch, later by the General for Special Assignment, if necessary in cooperation with the Army Personnel Office.

3. Military law: handled by the Army Judge Advocate General's Branch (at first under the Chief of Supply and Administration, later under the General for Special Assignment).

4. Questions on responsibility for execution:* handled by the respective branch of the Chief Supply and Administration.

The Chief of the General Staff was kept informed by the various branches on essential questions in their fields. He was authorized, insofar as he found it necessary, to present his opinion in these problems to the Commander in Chief of the Army.

With the exception of the short term occupation of the position of Assistant Chief of Staff II to replace Assistant Chief of Staff I who was ill, only the following positions continued after mobilization:

Assistant Chief of Staff I, as the representative of the Chief of the General Staff in routine matters and to relieve the burden on the latter.

Assistant Chief of Staff IV, as the top level functionary of the intelligence service.

Assistant Chief of Staff V, as the director of military-scientific work in the zone of interior and as the representative of the Chief of the General Staff with the elements of the General Staff of the Army High Command which remained in Berlin.

The separate studies on the functions of Assistant Chiefs of Staff I, IV and V provide information on their cooperation with the Chief of the

* To determine which agency was to undertake a function and be responsible for its fulfillment.

General Staff.

The branch chiefs of the General Staff working at Headquarters were directly responsible to the Chief of the Army General Staff as far as their official work was concerned. The chiefs of arms and services, although classified as subordinates to the Commander in Chief of the Army by the very nature of their assignment, for example,a General der Artillerie,was detached by the Commander in Chief of the Army for all questions touching on the field of his competence to the Chief of the General Staff, depended on the latter's directives and, within the framework of the Headquarters, worked under him as branches of the General Staff. As a result, uniform and tight control of the entire operations in Headquarters was secured by the Chief of the General Staff.

The Chief of the General Staff, using the information contained in reports on enemy and friendly activities and after a conference with the Commander in Chief of the Army, furnished the ideas which served as basis for the work of the branch chiefs. Branch chiefs, who did not participate in person in the conferences held by the Chief of the General Staff for this purpose, were kept informed by Assistant Chief of Staff I. Thereupon, the branches in close cooperation took the measures required to implement the plans. They submitted orders for approval and supervised their execution by the field command agencies subordinate to the Headquarters. Fundamental orders were submitted by the respective branches, after clearance by the Chief of the General Staff, to the Commander in Chief of the Army for his approval. Less important directives were issued by the Chief of the General Staff "by order of the Commander in Chief."

For tasks exceeding the scope of the Headquarters, and to provide uniform control of the education and training of the General Staff of the entire Army and, in addition, to direct the personnel policy of the General Staff, the Chief had at his disposal the Central Branch. This branch was headed by a talented General Staff officer having the special confidence of the Chief and able to relieve the latter in the fulfillment of these important tasks.

After the resignation of Feldmarschall Walter von Brauchitsch (December 1941) and after Hitler took over the function of Commander in Chief of the Army, there was no essential change, at least outwardly, in the position of the Chief of the General Staff. But his functions, which until that time had been under the direct supervision of Feldmarschall von Brauchitsch (General for Special assignment, Army Affairs Branch), were transferred to Feldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel as Hitler's representative and in practice were lost, as far as their cooperation with the Chief of the General Staff was concerned. (See Chart 3.) Actually, the direct supervision of the Chief of the General Staff by Hitler was a fundamental change, inasmuch as the interests of the Army were no longer represented by a compact, uniformly controlled headquarters of the Army High Command at the Wehrmacht High Command. In the sphere of the conduct of operations, the Chief of the General Staff alone was left to face a personality who united all the powers of government, the Wehrmacht, and the Army in his person and who guarded his authority ruthlessly and jealously. This individual did not have the slightest knowledge in the field of conduct of operations. He showed extreme distrust of military technical advisers,

he had an unshakable faith in his own genius and a stubbornness which disregarded all the military values and experiences which had been valid until then. This unequal balance of power made a mockery of what the function of the Chief of the General Staff should have been in the top level organization. The Chief of the General Staff of the Army became, in the following years, the "headquarters" of the war lord Hitler for the East. The other theaters of war were controlled directly by the Wehrmacht High Command and thus were not under his influence. Organization was replaced by improvisation; training was neglected completely.

In the fall of 1942 the functions of the Assistant Chiefs of Staff were discontinued. The handling of General Staff personnel matters (Control Branch) was taken out of the hands of the Chief of the General Staff and his influence on control and education of the entire General Staff was restricted considerably.

The chiefs of arms and services were able to make themselves more and more independent by assuming the functions of inspector generals and, in part also, as Wehrmacht agencies directly under Hitler. This anarchy, which spread through the entire "Leader State" in conjunction with the softening up resulting from the events at the front, ended with the Chief of the General Staff sinking to the position of a tactical adviser and private secretary to Hitler, the War Lord.

The decline of this once so highly esteemed function gives the history of the office a bitter ending.*

signed: Franz HALDER

* Reader is referred to commentaries by General Zeitzler and General Guderian appearing in "The German Army High Command-OKH," Synopsis, V, B-18 and B-19.

Chief of the Army General Staff

Chart 1

Organization of the Office of the Chief of the General Staff to 1938.

Chief of the General Staff of the Army (Permanent representative of the Commander in Chief of the Army).

Central Branch

Branch 1: Operations

Branch 2: Organization

Branch 3: Foreign Armies West

Branch 4: Training

Branch 5: Railway Transportation

Branch 6: Supply

Branch 7: Military Science

Branch 8: Technology

Branch 9: Mapping and Survey

Branch 10: Land Fortifications*

Branch 11: Officers Training

Branch 12: Eastern Intelligence Branch

Attache Branch

Consolidation of branches under Assistant Chief of Staff:

Assistant Chief of Staff I: Operations (1, 9, 10, temporarily 5 & 6)

Assistant Chief of Staff II: Training (4, 11, temporarily 7)

Assistant Chief of Staff III: 1937-38 Supply (5 and 6)
1938-39 Organization and Technology 2 and 8)

* The Land Fortifications Branch was dissolved in 1938 its work was added to that of the Operations Branch.

Assistant Chief of Staff IV: Intelligence (3, 12, Attache Branch)

Assistant Chief of Staff V : Military Science (7, an additional branch for military history was planned).

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Department of the Army
Office of the Chief of Military History
Washington 25, D. C.

MS # P-041d

TOP-LEVEL AGENCIES OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF:

The Chief of Operations, Training, and Organization

Chapter II

D R A F T T R A N S L A T I O N

Originally prepared for Headquarters, European Command
Office of the Chief Historian

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Restricted Classification
Removed Per
Executive Order 10501

MS # P-041d

TOP-LEVEL AGENCIES OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF:
The Chiefs of Operations, Training, and Organization

by

Guenther Blumentritt, General der Infanterie a.D.
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Reviewer : Capt. E.K. Stewart

Historical Division
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
1952

Guenther BLUMENTRITT
General der Infanterie
Date of Birth: 10 February 1892
Place of Birth: Munich, Germany

Commissioned as a second lieutenant in 1912 after training in the Danzig Officer Candidate Training School, BLUMENTRITT fought on the west and east fronts in World War I as platoon, company, and battalion leader. After postwar service in a volunteer corps in Munich, Saxony and Silesia from January to October 1919, he was assigned to the 15th Infantry Regiment of Germany's post-World War I Army. In 1920-22 he attended the War Colleges at Stuttgart and Berlin and in 1932-33 continued his studies on history, political science and national economy at the Berlin University.

Promoted colonel in 1938, Generalmajor in January 1942, Generalleutnant in December of the same year, and General der Infanterie in April 1944, BLUMENTRITT held many important assignments during World War II including tours as Operations Officer of Army Groups in Poland and France in 1939 and 1940, Chief of Staff, Fourth Army, during the drive on Moscow in 1940-41, First General Staff Officer in the Army General Staff in Russia in 1942, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief West in 1942-44, Acting Commander of the XII SS Corps* in 1944-45, Commander in Chief of Twenty-Fifth Army in Holland in March 1945, Acting Commander in Chief of the First Airborne Army in April 1945 and of the Blumentritt Army in Verde, Hamburg and Luebeck from 8 April to the end of the war. General BLUMENTRITT finally was taken prisoner in Schleswig-Holstein on 31 May 1945.

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* During this assignment General BLUMENTRITT was given temporary rank as SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen-SS.

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Alfred ZERBEL
Colonel, GSC
Date of Birth: 8 September 1904
Place of Birth: Ostritz near
Zittau, Saxony

Alfred Zerbel joined the Army in 1924, entering the 10th Infantry Regiment at Dresden as a private. In 1926-27 he underwent training in the Ohrdruf Officer Candidate School and in the latter year received his commission as second lieutenant. Following further officer training at the Berlin War College in 1935, 1936 and 1937, he was granted GSC status on 1 April 1939. From 1938-40 he served as technical officer in the Training Division of the Army General Staff in various localities in Germany and at OKH Headquarters in Fontainebleau, France.

Following assignments with the field forces as operations officer at division level and as regimental commander he was transferred to the Army General Staff as Chief, Training Division, in September 1942, holding this post until December 1944 with a brief break in February-March 1943 as Acting Chief of Staff, XIII Infantry Corps. After taking part in a training course for regimental commanders Zerbel, who had meanwhile been promoted colonel, was given command of a "Kampfgruppe", a combat group, of the 11th Panzer Division in April 1945. He was finally captured at Neumarkt, Bavaria, on 4 May 1945.

CHAPTER 2

TOP-LEVEL AGENCIES OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF:

CHIEFS OF OPERATIONS, TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION

The positions of the assistant chiefs of staff (Oberquartiermeister) in the Army General Staff were instituted before 1914 in the former Great General Staff* of the old German Army before World War I, but this study will not go into these positions in any detail.

The assistant chiefs were subordinate to the Chief of the Army General Staff and, acting in accordance with the latter's instructions, served to coordinate related branches and spheres of activity within the General Staff for the purpose of operational command. They were intended to relieve the Chief of the General Staff of many of his duties.

These assistant chiefs of staff (Oberquartiermeister) should not be confused with the chiefs of supply and administration (General-quartiermeister), or assistant chiefs of staff (Oberquartiermeister) of army groups and armies, and the "Quartiermeister" of infantry and motorized army corps. The last three officers handled the large and complex field of logistics and army supply, while the "Oberquartier-meister" in the Army General Staff were agencies of the Chief of the General Staff for cooperation in operational questions. They had nothing to do with logistics and the army supply system.

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* Planning staff of the Imperial German Army, located in the War Ministry.

I. THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS*: NATURE, SIGNIFICANCE, AND PURPOSE.

The Chief of Operations was the permanent deputy of the Chief of the General Staff. As such he was personally kept informed by the latter of all essentials, especially of aims and intentions. He was, thus, an important factor in securing uniformity in the work of the command. Upon instructions from his Chief, the Chief of Operations directed, but did not personally handle, major fields of activity in which the several officers of the General Staff collaborated. The Chief of the General Staff was relieved of burdensome detail and freed to devote his time to the major problems of command.

In order that the Chief of Operations might always be available for a variety of tasks, with a variety of assistants, and for a variety of spheres of activity, he was not restricted to any specific office and no specific branches were placed under him. He was not a fixed link in the command hierarchy, but rather a deputy (Beauftragter) of the Chief. Although as such he did not possess any general plenary powers, he acquired such powers from time to time.

The Chief of Operations also represented the Chief of the General Staff to outside agencies in the field of the operational command, for example, by making trips to the front, representing the interests of the General Staff in dealings with the Commander in Chief of the Replacement Army. He served to intensify liaison with the front and to

* Oberquartiermeister I (O. Qu. I): Assistant Chief of the General Staff in charge of Operations at OKH. In this study referred to as Chief of Operations. This study covers only the position of Chief of Operations during the war. Certain statements refer to the period from 15 January to 25 September 1942 (campaign against Russia). No attempt is made to give an account of the historical development of the position. Various activities of the Chief of Operations are described in greater detail in other portions of this series.

expedite the requests of the operational command in negotiations with the various ministries. The Chief of Operations held a position which might be compared with that of an American deputy director.

Hence, the Chief of Operations occupied a special position among the assistant deputy chiefs of staff of the Army General Staff who were assigned fixed spheres of activity and placed in charge of specific branches. One might say, "An office not limited to any specific department and at the immediate disposal of the Chief of the General Staff."

In keeping with the peculiar character of his office the Chief of Operations did not need any real staff. He had at his disposal one junior General Staff officer with the rank of captain or major as his assistant, one special-missions staff officer (a reserve officer) for office work, one or two clerks and draftsmen, and one or two automobiles.

Before discussing certain individual activities, the normal daily routine in the office of the Chief of Operations may be briefly described.

Before 0100: The assistant submitted the situation maps of the Eastern Front to the Chief of Operations, as well as the most important reports which had been received from the front during the preceding night.

At 0100: The daily report on the situation was made to the Chief of the General Staff. This was regularly attended by the following: The Chief of Operations and the Chief of Intelligence; the Chief of the Operations Branch, who gave a report on the situation; the Chief of the Eastern Intelligence Branch; the Chief of Supply and Administration;

the Chief of Transportation Service; and the Chief of the Signal Communication Service.

The following were also frequently invited: The Chief of the Organization Branch, the Chief of the Training Branch, and specialists as required.

During the situation report the Chief of the General Staff issued brief instructions, asked questions, and made new assignments.

At the conclusion of the report the Chief of the General Staff usually detained one of the above-mentioned specialists in order to inform himself in greater detail about individual questions and to issue special instructions. The remainder of the day and the evening hours until 2200, were left to the Chief of Operations for handling the tasks which had been assigned to him.

At 2200: Another short conference on the situation was held with the Chief of the General Staff, but generally the only participants were the Chief of the Operations Branch, who delivered the report, and the Chief of Operations. Afterwards, the Chief of the General Staff issued any individual orders which were still necessary.

Other reports by the Chief of Operations to the Chief of the General Staff were made in between times, either after a request for an interview or following the evening report. After the evening conference the Chief of Operations still had time to take care of a considerable amount of work. There were never any "office hours" for the German General Staff!

This normal routine during the day and the night was interrupted whenever the Chief of Operations had to make official trips to the front

as the representative of the Chief of the General Staff.

On exceptional occasions and on special orders, the Chief of Operations attended the daily noon report which the Chief of the General Staff delivered to the Fuehrer in the OKW. Usually he remained behind to represent the Chief at the command post of the OKH.

The Chief of the Operations Branch* was directly subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff and delivered personal reports to him. However, he was also instructed by the service regulations to inform the Chief of Operations about all important occurrences and intentions besides those of the above-mentioned situation conferences.

This was generally done through the assistant officer of the Chief of Operations, who obtained the information from the Operations Branch, which forwarded also the basic operations orders to the Chief of Operations. This method of cooperation proved successful and never led to any disagreements.

Two other branches,** Organization Branch Two and Training Branch Four, were also directly subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff, and their chiefs reported personally to the latter. The Army Film Center in Berlin was attached to the Training Branch. It was the duty of the Chief of Operations to secure coordination between these two branches in accordance with the instructions of the Chief of the General Staff and to

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* The reader is cautioned to make a necessary distinction between the Chief of Operations Branch One and the Chief of Operations (Oberquartiermeister I).

** Details concerning these two branches are discussed below.

coordinate similar or overlapping subdivisions of the work in line with the requirements of the operational command.

Several practical examples may be used to illustrate this coordination. The Chief of the General Staff requests a specific number of new personnel and amount of materiel to carry out certain operational tasks which have been assigned by him. The Organization Branch must carry out this task, or cause it to be carried out, in cooperation with the Commander in Chief of the Replacement Army and his agencies. Thus, a large number of different government offices and agencies are consulted in connection with this work. It was the duty of the Chief of Operations to facilitate this cooperation and, if necessary, call on the Commander in Chief of the Replacement Army and his sub-branches.

The peculiar features of the different theaters of operation, the differences between the combat conditions, and above all the changing military experiences on the fighting fronts, made it necessary to supplement, improve, and revise the training manuals constantly. It is only by very close contact with the fighting troops that one can obtain up-to-date information, and this has to be immediately evaluated.

Experience has shown that the requirements of training and organization often overlap. The Commander in Chief of the Replacement Army must be regularly informed of all new developments at the front in order to take advantage of these experiences as quickly as possible in training the replacement units in the zone of the interior. It was the duty of the Chief of Operations to facilitate cooperation in these many different fields for the purposes of the operational command.

Those who fought on the Eastern Front will never forget the severe winter of 1941 - 1942. These conditions made it desirable to publish a practical "pocket manual for winter warfare" for field use. This manual was prepared in 1942 by compiling the experiences of the frontline troops and statements by prisoners, as well as by evaluating captured enemy orders and studying the experience gained by the Finnish Army. The manual was edited by the Training Branch. Almost all the branches of the General Staff, the Commander in Chief of the Replacement Army and many other agencies took part in the work. The Chief of Operations secured their cooperation in order to assist the operational command in its requests.

These examples should illustrate the work of liaison and coordination in the field of the Chief of Operations.

In the zone of the interior the chiefs of arms and services (Waffengenerale) of the most improtant service arms were subordinate to the Commander in Chief of the Replacement Army. In order to establish efficient liaison between the field staffs of the OKH and the subordinate frontline staffs on the one hand and the above-mentioned service and arm inspectorates under the Commander in Chief of the Replacement Army on the other hand, the positions of the so-called chiefs of arms and services attached to the Commander in Chief of the Army were created.

These officers were subordinate to the Commander in Chief of the Army, but after the dismissal of the last Commander in Chief of the Army in the winter of 1941 - 1942, they were, in actual practice, subordinate to the Chief of the Army General Staff.

"Waffengenerale" were the titles of their positions. However, most of the holders of these positions were not generals, but often colonels or lieutenant colonels. Their number varied during the war according to the necessities of the time. Some of the services and arms were: Chief of Infantry; Chief of Artillery; Chief of Engineers, Railroad Engineers, and Fortresses; Chief of Panzer Troops and Antitank Units (the latter was later constituted as an independent branch); Chief of Chemical Troops (later included the Rocket-Projector Arm).

The duties of these officers were as follows:

1. To make frequent visits to the fronts, not only in order to hear wishes, complaints, and requests, but also to gain personal knowledge of the combat conditions of their service arm.

2. To inform the Chief of the General Staff of their impressions and the problems of the field units.

3. To inform the Training Branch, which prepared the new field manuals and training bulletins with the arms and services, and to submit drafts of them to the Chief of the General Staff before they were printed.

4. To maintain close liaison with the service arm inspectorates of the Commander in Chief of the Replacement Army in Germany so that the schools, instructors and replacement units under him would be informed of the experience gained by the combat troops.

The Chief of Operations promoted cooperation among the chiefs of the arms and services, and harmonized differences of opinion. He also saw that trips were made by the chiefs of arms and services to the different front sectors as determined by operational necessities. For example, if

a German offensive was intended or was already in progress, or if the enemy had launched an offensive, the Chief of Operations directed the chiefs of arms and services to the points of main effort. Whenever possible, he arranged these trips to take place simultaneously, so that the field units would not be bothered by constant visits.

The Chief of Operations assembled all the chiefs of arms and services who were present in the OKH once a week for a joint conference. Each of the participants presented an oral report of his experiences and suggestions to the whole group. Without prejudicing the right of the chiefs of arms and services to make personal reports to the Chief of the General Staff, the Chief of Operations gave to the latter a summary of the results of these conferences and obtained new decisions.

The Chief of the Military Mapping and Survey Branch of the Army General Staff prepared extensive military-geographical studies of the theaters of operations and produced and printed military maps of all kinds, as well as special maps. Located in Berlin, the Chief of the Military Mapping and Survey Branch was directly subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff.

At appropriate times, the Chief of Operations informed this Branch of any requests and wishes resulting from the operational intentions and from the requirements of the command and the field units. During fairly long operational phases, special requests were often received from the frontline staffs for the production of special maps or the improvement of inadequate maps. A permanent branch office of the Chief

of Military Mapping and Survey was incorporated in the Army General Staff.* This working precedure was facilitated by the military-geographical sections and "map centers" at higher and intermediate headquarters.

During the first part of the war, the Army had its own aircraft for operational and tactical reconnaissance. Army aviation was coordinated in the Army High Command by one top-level authority which carried varying official designations. The Chief of Operations brought air reconnaissance into the closest possible connection with operational necessities. There was also a direct exchange of ideas between the General of the Luftwaffe and the Operations Branch, as well as with the Eastern Intelligence Branch.

At the beginning of 1942, this authority in the OKH was dissolved and the Army aviation units were taken over by the Luftwaffe (Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe). Only a small liaison staff was left in the Army High Command and this group generally remained in direct contact with the Operations Branch.

After the reorganization establishing a new division of authority between the Commander in Chief of the Army and the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, the Army's Chief of Operations regularly forwarded the reconnaissance reports of the Luftwaffe to the Army Group commanders.

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* Statement is misleading, since the chief of Military Mapping and Survey was a Branch of the Army General Staff. Author may be referring to a representative permanently located at Field Headquarters of the Army High Command.

He also had the important function of insuring close liaison between the Luftwaffe and the combat unit staffs with respect to reconnaissance

The Commander in Chief of the Replacement Army was the military officer whose command comprised the entire zone of the interior; and for the sake of better understanding, he could probably be described with the otherwise customary title of "war minister", insofar as the Army was concerned. His manifold interrelations are obvious, and connections extended from his office to the OKH and subordinate field staffs, and vice versa.

The Chief of Operations, upon orders from the Chief of the General Staff, established direct contacts with the Commander in Chief of the Replacement Army from time to time for very specific purposes, that is, to forward the requests of the operation commands and to handle negotiations.

Besides the fields of activity which have already been indicated, the Chief of Operations received special assignments from the Chief of the General Staff.

In order to relieve himself of the work, or in order to obtain additional data for problems which had been prepared by somebody else, the Chief of the General Staff occasionally issued instructions to the Chief of Operations to prepare specific operational plans. These were intended only for the personal use of the Chief of the General Staff or the Chief of the Operations Branch.

The Chief of Operations was also sent by air to certain sectors of the front to establish liaison with army groups or armies and to discuss

operations or other matters. Unless expressly authorized, the Chief of Operations did not possess any responsibility of his own, for example, the right to issue, independently, orders to frontline headquarters. However, he reported to the Chief of the General Staff from the front by telephone or teletype concerning the results of these discussions and gave his personal recommendations. After his return he reported orally or in writing.

Several examples may serve to illustrate this activity of the Chief of Operations.

1. Mission to an army in the spring of 1942 to determine whether, in view of the situation in the Fourth Army, divisions earmarked for other fronts would have to be committed with this army.

2. Mission to the front of the Sixth Army in the summer of 1942 to ascertain whether or not the defense line on the Don could be held during the coming winter of 1942 - 43.

3. Mission to a breakthrough point in the front of one of our allies in order to seal off the gap again through cooperation of adjacent German front units.

4. Mission to Army Group North and the Eighteenth Army, late in the summer of 1942, for the purpose of instructing them about the intended attack on Leningrad. (The attack was not carried out.)

In summary it may be said that the Chief of Operations occupied a position which was personally subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff. His duties were manifold and changed from time to time. The object and purpose of his office was to coordinate certain fields of ac-

tivity for the benefit of the operational command and in accordance with the instructions of the Chief of the General Staff. The Chief of Operations had no office under his personal supervision. In many cases the directors of the other agencies, which have been mentioned, were senior in rank. Therefore, he always had to use tact and often had to employ intermediaries. There was no friction whatsoever.

In the personal and experienced judgment of General Blumentritt the higher staffs, which are in the service of the cause and the troops, must always keep certain principles:

1. The staff exists for the benefit of the troops and not vice versa.

2. The personnel of a staff should be as small as possible, for only then will the work be facilitated.

3. The individual members of a staff must get along with each other, although their temperaments may be entirely different. The troops notice very quickly whether or not harmony prevails in a staff.

These principles can be enforced only by a commander or his Chief of Staff. In the General Staff of the former German Army this foundation was provided by the chiefs of staff.

After the dismissal of the last, real "Chief of Staff" of the German General Staff in autumn 1942, the Chief of Operations was also dismissed. No new man was appointed and his position was discontinued.

If this position is dispensed with, many tasks must be taken over by the Chief of the Operations Branch. However, since this officer already carries a heavy burden of work, it will again be necessary to

releive him of some of it. Not much is gained by this step.

Hence, the position of Chief of Operations, whose incumbent the Chief of the General Staff was able to select from the entire Army, had a definite purpose and proved worthwhile.

/s/ Guenther Blumentritt

II. THE CHIEF OF TRAINING

From 1 October 1937 to 1 September 1939, the branches of the General Staff which handled training matters were: Branch Four (troop training), Branch Eleven (officer training), Branch Seven (military science). These branches were united under the Chief of Training (Oberquartiermeister II).

The Chief of Training was subordinate to the Chief of the Army General Staff and was responsible to the latter for the performance of his official duties. The office of the Chief of Training consisted of the Chief himself, one junior General Staff officer as his adjutant, and one typist.

The duties of the Chief of Training were to insure uniform administration of training matters in the respective branches and to handle special assignments in the field of training on the orders of the Chief of the General Staff. For example, in the autumn of 1937 a study concerning the use of panzer units as a part of infantry divisions was prepared.

In addition, the Chief of Training personally directed the advanced tactical training of the General Staff officers in the OKH. He prescribed rules for the training of these General Staff officers (concerning the preparation of written problems, the conduct of tactical trips, terrain discussions, war games) and personally assigned tactical problems to the senior General Staff officers.

The Chief of Training did not interfere with the regular daily work of the branches under his direction. The positions of the branch chiefs as direct subordinates to the Chief of the General Staff were not affected

by the fact that they were united under the Chief of Training. Whenever the branch chiefs made reports to the Chief of the General Staff, they were required to inform the Chief of Training, so that after making his own decision, he could attend these meetings and prevent his own views.

Upon mobilization, the position of Chief of Training was discontinued. For a short time in the spring of 1940 it was reestablished and its incumbent was charged with preparing tactical and operational studies on the orders of the Chief of the General Staff.

Officers who occupied the position of Chief of Training were:

October 1937 - February 1938	General der Artillerie Franz Halder
February 1938 - July 1938	Generalleutnant Heinrich von Stuelpnagel
July 1938 - 1 September 1939	Generalmajor Hans-Juergen Sixt von Arnim
Spring 1940	Generalmajor Mieth

/s/ Alfred Zerbel

III. THE CHIEF OF ORGANIZATION

Until autumn 1938, Branch Six (Supply and Administration) and Branch Five (Transportation) were united under the Chief of Organization. According to service regulations, these branches were completely independent with respect to their work and had the right to make direct reports to the Chief of the Army General Staff (in special cases even to the Commander in Chief of the Army), from whom they also received direct instructions for their work.

The Chief of Organization was not consulted in the regular daily work, but he was kept informed. He handled individual tasks which were specially assigned to him by the Chief of the Army General Staff. These were problems for study in connection with the work of the Fifth and Sixth Branches; for example: issue of ammunition for divisions, corps, armies, as well as the requirements of the supply trains; road repairs, movements of large motorized units; traffic control; revision of Part II of the Field Service Regulations.

During a reorganization of the Army General Staff in the autumn of 1938, both Branch Six and Branch Five were placed under the Chief of Operations (Oberquartiermeister I). All General Staff branches which were of importance for the conduct of operations were also united under him. Branch One (Operations) was already under him. This organization continued until the end of August 1939.

On 1 December 1938, Branch Two (Organizational Branch) and Branch Eight (Technical Branch) were added to those already under the Chief of Operations. This organization continued until the outbreak of the war.

[redacted]

MS # P-041d

Dr. Waldemar ERFURTH
General der Infanterie
German General attached
to the Finnish Armed Forces

Nuestadt, November 1947

THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY HISTORY (O.Qu V)

Origin and Functions

VI

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Translator: H.J. BAERWALDT
Editor: G. VANDERSTADT
Reviewer: Lt.Col. R.R. VERNON

HISTORICAL DIVISION
EUROPEAN COMMAND

[redacted]

Restricted Classification
Removed Per
Executive Order 10501

MS # P-041d

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Born: 4 August 1879 in
Berlin

ERFURTH joined the Army immediately after leaving school and received his commission as 2nd lieutenant on 27 January 1899. Promoted to captain on 22 March 1922, on the same day he was appointed Director of Mapping and Surveying in Berlin. In World War I he served in various positions with the field forces and in the General Staff at the eastern and western fronts.

From 1919 to 1924 he served as Operations Officer and Chief of Staff of I Corps Area Headquarters in Koenigsberg, Eastern Prussia, later the same position in a General Staff group in Berlin until 1929, when he was promoted Generalmajor. For the next two years he was Commander of Infantry, Schwerin, II Corps Area Headquarters, which assignment terminated with his promotion to Generalleutnant on 1 May 1931. Then ERFURTH resigned and took up his studies in philosophy at the Freiburg University, remaining there from 1931 to 1934. Recalled to the Army in 1934, he became Chief of the Section for PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF WAR EXPERIENCE, at Potsdam, and later, for two years, Chief MILITARY SCIENCE BRANCH, Berlin. After a term of four years, 1938 - 1941, as Fifth Senior General Staff Officer (O Qu V) handling military history, ERFURTH was appointed GERMAN GENERAL ATTACHED TO THE FINNISH ARMED FORCES, which post he held until 1944. During this time he received his Ph.D. degree from Freiburg University.

During the last year of the War he was in the Officer Reserve Pool, OKH. General ERFURTH was captured in his home at Markleberg near Leipzig on 25 May 1945.

THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY HISTORY (O.Qu.V)

The scope of the office of Assistant Chief of Staff V (O.Qu.V) comprised the military science, and especially the fields of military history and military theory. The agencies formed to cover these fields, were either established or reorganized for the purpose of the General Staff between 1933 and 1938. The following study will show the purpose for which they were created and the way they worked.

Introduction

It was the intention of General Beck, Chief of the General Staff during these years, to continue in the path of the old pre-1914 General Staff, insofar as conditions allowed. Beck was a conservative man. We knowlingly followed in the tradition of the Old General Staff and took pains in trying to adjust the requirements of the new era, which was filled with political unrest and which was hostile to culture, to the old and tried organization. Whenever something new had to be done, he asked himself how it would have been handled in the past. The old installations from the time of Moltke and Schlieffen were his standard. It was difficult to move him to make changes in the old methods. Had he remained in office longer and had his work been done in a more calm period, he would surely have created something of lasting value.

From which qualities of the old General Staff did General Beck take the great ideal which served him as a goal for his administration? It was characteristic of the General Staff before 1941 that all of its leading members, those who occupied the most important of-

fices, were not only excellent soldiers, but also had a general education far exceeding their specialized knowledge. When the Prussian General Staff was born, after the Wars of Liberation [1815], not only Mars but also the Muses stood at its cradle. Scharnhorst and his disciples were extremely well educated and talented men. Not all of the general staff officers of the nineteenth century shone in the scientific firmament or were great philosophers, but the educational level of the old General Staff of the imperial days was astonishingly high on the whole, as is proven by the great number of significant German military authors who have written works of lasting value.

In German military literature of the nineteenth century, which is attributable chiefly to the General Staff, military history and military theory occupied a particularly large place. They were complemented, however, by works of a general historical and philosophical nature, and also by a great number of memoirs and studies which testify to the high intellecual level of their authors. They were of great value for the history of their time. Following the examples of its great chiefs, Scharnhorst, Mueffling, Moltke and Schlieffen, the old Prussian General Staff had a pronounced inclination for writing and considered itself in honor bound to present to the entire officers' corps the deeper insight which it enjoyed in contemporary history and its problems, and thereby exercise a stimulating and fruitful effect on the officers' education.

Beck's successor in office, General Halder, thought along more progressive lines than his predecessor. His ideal was the elder Moltke. On the other hand, he did not fully share in the great admiration which the General Staff had for Count Schlieffen at the turn of the

century. He found Schlieffen's theories too rigid, too dogmatic. He saw possibilities of great success in independent creation rather than in rigid observance of the laws and rules of modern warfare as worked out and set forth in polished forms by Schlieffen. According to Halder's opinion, a modern Alexander the Great should be an intellectually free, creative artist, unrestricted by operational theory. Halder did not wish to see the reorganization of the General Staff take the form of an imitation of the former Great General Staff. In view of the fact that some form of organization had to be set up within a short time, Halder intended to use the frame of the Great General Staff as a pattern, but for the rest he wished to create something new, something which met the requirements of the day. The new German General Staff was not to be a copy of the old Great General Staff.

During the classical era of the General Staff prior to 1914, history had taken up a great part of the time devoted to the training and intellectual work of the general staff officers. The fact that it had been possible in the nineteenth century to develop literary forces of consoderable volume in spite of the great overburdening of the General Staff with official work proves that the general staff institution had kept itself free from narrowmindedness and had attracted versatile talents. There was an abundance of gifted men, particularly during the period from 1870 to 1900, who were encouraged by the elder Moltke. But even in the years between the turn of the century and 1914 there were a few outstanding figures such as Schlieffen, Freytag-Loringhoven, Kuhl, Goltz, Bernhardy, among a great number of lesser men. The picture changed, however, after World War I. There were only a few men left of the older generation, which had proved itself in the field of military his-

tory before 1914. The conditions of the postwar period did not permit a new generation of military historians to arise. A hopeful effort to revive the writing of military history and encourage research among the young general staff officers had already been made by Beck's predecessor. A few young general staff officers were detached to the National Archives in Potsdam for a year in order to help edit the official history of World War I and to gain insight in the writing of military history. But this measure, which would surely have had very favorable effects if it had lasted longer, was soon completely discontinued because of lack of personnel.

The study of military history had to take second place to more important problems. Inasmuch as the training of historians had had to be dropped, the General Staff depended on makeshifts and emergency solutions.

Thus, in the courses in military history given assistant chiefs of staff and later, at the Military Academy, old retired generals had to be used as instructors. Moreover, the instructors at the military academy did not have enough source material, since the official work on World War I progressed only slowly. The fact that even the volumes of the Militaerwissenschaftliche Rundschau /Review of Military Science/seldom offered compositions of a military-historical content for the purpose of making the reader familiar with new developments can be traced to this lack in material and qualified historians. It was plain that the officers' corps between the two World Wars did not reach the same level in military history and even in general education as that attained by the officers' corps during the long period of peace before 1914. This was to be seen clearly in the decline in valuable military-science literature.

General Beck had very early recognized these differences in the intellectual field between the old and the new days. He tried constantly to find relief for this condition. He not only wanted to increase the specialized knowledge and raise the level of general education of the general staff officers. He had a higher goal. The entire officers' corps of the Army and even of the entire Wehrmacht, was to be enlightened by the General Staff and to be stimulated in its striving for education, as had been the case in the General Staff of the older Moltke. Everything done by Beck in this respect was based on the knowledge possessed before 1914. Everywhere the roots of the old General Staff were to be encouraged to put forth new shoots.

Let us follow the road taken by General Beck and by his successor, General Halder, who was filled with a like yearning for knowledge, towards this goal by means of the following time table.

Time Table

1933 Transformation of the Historical Section of the National Archives at Potsdam into an "Institute for Army Historical Research."

1934 Reactivation of the "Section of Evaluation of War Experiences," attached to the National Archives at Potsdam as a component of the Troops Office.

1935 Transformation of the "Institute for Army Historical Research" into a "Research Institute for Military and Army History" under the supervision of the War Ministry of the Reich.

Transformation and expansion of the "Section for Evaluation of War Experience" into the "7th (Military Science) Branch of the Army."

1 Jan 1936 Beginning of publication of the "Review of Military Science."

1936 Separation of the Army Archives from the National Archives and the German Lands' Archives and Consolidation of all Army Archives under the Chief of Army Archives at Potsdam.

1937 The "Research Institute for Military and Army History becomes the "Military History Research Institute of the Army."

1938 Establishment of an Assistant Chief of Staff for Military History (O.Qu.V.).

1938 Consolidation of all libraries of the army under the supervision of a "Chief of Army Libraries" subordinate to the Army General Staff.

1939 The Wehrmacht Publications Section is placed under the supervision of the Chief of Army Libraries.

Explanatory Notes

1. Military History Research Institute

In accordance with the Treaty of Versailles, the Military History Branches of the old General Staff, which had been ordered dissolved, had been transferred to the newly founded National Archives at Potsdam, together with the war documents of World War I. The first volumes of the official work on World War I were published by the National Archives. The influence of the Troops Office on these publications was unofficial only and remained limited.

With the gradual separation of the Military History Research Institute from the National Archives, which began in 1933, and with its assignment to the Minister of War, who invested the Army Chief of Staff with the authority to issue directions for this institute, military history had reclaimed the traditional place in the General Staff which it had enjoyed from the days of Scharnhorst to World War I. The General Staff was now able to exert greater influence on the contents of the official war study and to accelerate completion of the final volumes. President Wolfgang Foerster headed the Military History Research Institute from 1933 to the end of World War II.

2. Section for Evaluation of War Experiences and Military Science Branch

In 1934, General Dr. Erfurth, who had been called from Freiburg to Potsdam, was given the direction of the Section for Evaluation by General Beck. This section was transformed in 1935 into the 7th (Military Science) Branch of the Army.

The Section for Evaluation, which subsequently became the Military Science Branch, had the following tasks:

a. To raise the level of the general and specialized knowledge of the officers' corps.

b. To develop the military history knowledge of the officers.

c. To ascertain the historical precedents for current military problems.

d. To help in the editing of new military-scientific publications and re-editions. (The Interior Branch of the Wehrmacht High Command was in charge of the censorship).

The spheres of activity of this section were as follows:

a. The writing of a history of the Russian-Polish war of 1918-1920. (This two-volume work was finished in 1939 and was ready for distribution at the publishing house of E.S. Mittler and Sohn in Berlin. The distribution of this study was stopped by Hitler).

b. The publication of the historical papers of Count Schlieffen and General von Moltke. (In 1939, Schlieffen's "Tactical and Strategic Problems" and "General Staff Trips in the East" were published).

c. The collection of historical material from the era of General von Moltke for the preparation of a projected history of the General Staff before 1914. (In 1939 a collection of material in manuscript form was being made).

d. The collection of military-historical material on the Chinese-Japanese War in the Far East.

e. The writing of strategic and tactical studies on World War I. (In 1939 the first volumes of these studies under the title of "Studies on Military History and Tactics" had been published by Mittler and Sohn).

f. The investigation of military-economic problems having arisen in World War I. (In 1939 the material was still in manuscript form).

g. Assisting in the edition of the work on World War I by the Military History Research Institute and in the edition of other military publications.

h. Attempts to achieve a motion-picture representation of parts of World War I. (The work was still in its initial stage in 1939).

i. Publication of the "Review of Military Science." It is worthwhile to give a detailed report on the new General Staff magazine started by General Beck and furthered by General Halder.

Foundation of the "Review of Military Science"

At the turn of the century a general staff magazine, sponsored by Count Schlieffen, was published under the title of "Die Vierteljahreshefte fuer Truppenfuehrung and Heereskunde" (Quarterly Review for Command of Troops and Army Matters). The editor of this magazine was General Freiherr Von Freitag-Loringhoven, who, being himself a gifted historian and military author, succeeded in obtaining the best men as collaborators. Count Schlieffen himself published several series of articles in the "quarterlies." This magazine maintained a high level and was much read by the entire officers' corps. Publication was stopped in 1914, with the beginning of World War I. The quarterlies had had a pronouncedly military and army-historical character.

In 1934 General Beck decided to found a general staff magazine along the line of the quarterlies. He hoped that the varied contents of this magazine, which was to maintain a high standard, and not be restricted to military and army-historical studies would exert an influ-

ence on the specialized and general education of the German officers' corps.

Exceeding the scope of the Schlieffen quarterlies, this new publication of the General Staff was to have the character of a Wehrmacht magazine, and was to contain also contributions by the Navy and the Air Force.

The predominance given to military history in the quarterlies was to be avoided. The practical problems of modern warfare were to be treated from the viewpoint of the Wehrmacht and of its various branches.

General Erfurth, who was living in retirement in Freiburg, and studying and giving instruction at Freiburg University, was appointed editor of the new magazine, the "Review of Military Science," in the summer of 1934 by General Beck.

The goal set for the Review by Beck was never actually reached. But the magazine became well known and was much read. By 1939 the number of subscribers to the review had increased to 20,000. However, the standard of the review did not equal that attained by the quarterlies. It did not have the brilliant collaborators which were still available in great numbers before World War I. The military-scientific tradition had been broken off in 1918. It had not been possible to groom literary replacements. In addition to this, after 1933 the strict censorship of the authoritarian state oppressed all German literature. The most interesting and pressing problems of the day could not be examined in the review. Clever men who had something to say preferred to write about a safer subject and declined to write for the review to avoid trouble. The editorial staff of the review had to be very careful so as not to get both itself and the magazine into hot water.

In a country where there is freedom of the press it is probably hard to understand what it means to intellectual work when the right to utter one's opinion freely has been taken away and any attempt to retain it is threatened by severe punishment. When one thinks of all the difficulties caused by the threat to and the suppression of an independent and free opinion in Germany since 1933 one is astonished that the constraint applied to intellectual expression did not have greater effects on the magazine of the General Staff and that it did not deprive it of all substance.

The fact that Hitler and the Party had a negative and sometimes hostile attitude toward the General Staff as an institution and toward its tradition and methods of work had an adverse effect on the latter. The watchword "to be more than one seems to be" did not fit into the new period. The principle of the General Staff, which was to let its subagencies share in the responsibility was opposed to the fundamental principles of the National Socialist authoritarian government. The value of a solid and specialized education was not recognized by the Party. The request of the General Staff to be heard before political decisions were made was curtly turned down. The method of reaching a reasonable decision only after sober consideration and conscientious deliberation was regarded as obsolete and dull. The most important reason for the negative attitude adopted by Hitler and the Party towards the General Staff and their opposition to it was probably their profound distrust for the institution which was founded on a high idealism. Hitler's extremely distrustful nature had apparently seen in the General Staff something quite different from what it really was. His vigilant suspicion saw that the classic concept of the General Staff would

always conflict with the National Socialist doctrine and that the selection of general staff officers as carried out by the General Staff produced a different type of man from that which the schooling of the Party turned out. Hitler perhaps was afraid that some day the General Staff might threaten his despotism and that general staff officers might unit to overthrow him and the National Socialist regime, as was nearly the case on 20 July 1944. For this reason Hitler's opposition to the General Staff increased in ruthlessness as time passed.

It was because of this that the chiefs of staff and their most important co-workers had to be very careful so as not to increase the suspicion with which they were regarded. Consequently, the editorial staff of the "Review of Military Science" likewise had to employ a great deal of discretion so as not to provoke attacks by the Party and yet, in spite of these difficulties, to follow the road shown them by General Beck and his successor, Halder. This was all the more difficult to do because of the fact that no collaborators for the Review of Military Science were employed from Party circles and Party propaganda, widespread everywhere else, was barred from the magazine of the General Staff.

Basing himself on the idea that it is always easier to suppress intellectual aspiration than to revive it, Beck's successor, General Halder, decided in the fall of 1939 to continue publication of the Review even during the war. Thus it was possible to publish the magazine during the first years of the war without a noticeable decline in its level. When, however, in the spring of 1942, Hitler took the Review away from the General Staff and transferred it to his official

military historian its early end could not long be delayed. The new editor of the magazine, appointed by Hitler, did not regard his task as in the service of science and did not work according to Moltke's principle "to accomplish much while remaining inconspicuous." He used the Review to disseminate propaganda for Hitler who, in the writings of his official historians, became the greatest general of all times. Thus, from the spring of 1942 on, the Review became a mockery of the former general staff magazine. Collaborators of repute refrained from contributing and the contents of the magazine suffered in quality. Shortly before the collapse, the Review discontinued publication as the result of a decision taken by Hitler's historian, because of lack of material.

3. Chief of Army Archives

In the old army before 1914 the Prussian General Staff had only small archives dating from the time of Moltke's wars. These were the "Secret War Archives of the General Staff" which contained military documents from the "Moltke Wars." The documents of earlier wars (e.g. those of the Napoleonic era and the wars of Frederick the Great) were stored in the Secret Prussian State Archives in Dahlem, near Berlin.

World War I produced a great number of military papers, such as documents relating to the war, war diaries and situation maps. These were placed in the newly founded National Archives in Potsdam, where they formed the major part of the material stored.

The documents of former non-Prussian army contingents were stored in the War Archives of the various German states (Munich, Dresden, Stuttgart). Hence the situation before 1936 was characterized by a wide dispersion of military documents.

The desire to found a central Army Archives containing all German military documents had long been entertained by the General Staff and would have substantially facilitated military and army-historical research. Almost all chiefs of staff of the 19th century had demanded that such archives be established. But not even the elder Moltke and Schlieffen succeeded in breaking the resistance of the civil authorities and the desire of the states to carry on their own affairs. General Beck was the first to succeed in fulfilling the desire of the General Staff by combing all the military documents which had been stored at various places in the centrally directed Army Archives in 1936.

The Army Archives became an agency under the control of the Army General Staff. General Dr. Von Rabenau was appointed to direct it as "Chief of Army Archives." The Army Archives in Potsdam, having been separated from the National Archives in Potsdam, as well as the former Military Archives in Munich, Dresden and Stuttgart, were placed under his supervision.

Added during the following years were the Army Archives in Vienna (formed from the Vienna Military Archives and including the military documents of the old royal and imperial monarchy) and the Army Archives in Prague, in which all documents of the de-activated Czech Army were collected. These had been poorly protected at the entry of German troops and were found in a damaged condition. They were reclassified by German military archivists and conveniently arranged, so that a model Army Archives, meeting all requirements, was established in Prague within a short time.

With the outbreak of World War II in 1939 new important tasks confronted the Army Archives. Early in the war the German General Staff professed the opinion that archives and libraries were cultural properties, and as such were not to be treated as war booty. The German General Staff considered it a point of honor to protect cultural collections in countries occupied by the German Army from war damage. Archivists and librarians of the Army followed closely behind the advancing troops, placed the cultural installation of the enemy under the protection of the German Army and staffed them with German specialists.

The documents of the Polish Army were found in a particularly poor condition. They had been torn and scattered over the entire country in the hasty evacuation. Many documents were found in partly destroyed railroad cars and in trucks which had broken down on the highways and could be collected and brought back only gradually and with much trouble. Insofar as the German archivists succeeded in finding the Polish Archives, they were brought to Danzig and rearranged in a newly organized Army Archives in Oliva near Danzig. It took a great deal of work to place the documents of the Polish Army in order again because of the poor condition in which they had been found. But the great pains taken by the German archivists succeeded in the course of time in establishing order in the Army Archives at Danzig and in classifying what remained of the Polish military documents and preserving them for research.

When, in 1940, the Western Campaign achieved rapid successes, representatives of the Chief of Army Archives were at once assigned to Brussels, Paris and to the Hague to see to it that the archives of

the occupied enemy countries were not removed, and to safeguard their archives for the countries in question. Inasmuch as the indigenous archivists had in many cases fled, the German representatives set about organizing reliable protection for the documents and an orderly administration.

Owing to these precautionary measures by the Chief of the Army Archives, the archives of countries occupied by the German Wehrmacht on the whole remained in good order. The documents stayed where they were and were protected against removal, poor administration and destruction.

The German archives, on the other hand, did not fare so well during the war and, in particular during the postwar days. In fact, most of the material was lost. The information obtained regarding the fate of German war documents is unreliable and incomplete. The writing of scientific German military history based on source material has thus become impossible.

It has been established beyond doubt that the Army Archives in Potsdam, in which the war documents of both world wars had been collected, no longer exists. A great part of the documents was lost during the air raid of 14 April 1945, which destroyed a large storehouse. Some documents of the Potsdam Archives, which had been shifted for safe keeping, were destroyed by fire in Reichenhall. Others were removed by the Allies to Russia, Great Britain and the United States as captured enemy material.

Nothing has become known as yet in regard to the fate of the Army Archives at Dresden. If the documents were not destroyed in the great fire of Dresden, they were probably removed by the Russians as war booty.

The documents of the Army Archives of Munich and Stuttgart, which had been evacuated due to the intensification of air warfare, were saved and taken over by the Bavarian and Wuerttemberg State Archives, respectively. These were documents dating from before World War I only. Stuttgart did not have any documents of World War II, and Munich had such documents only in limited number. The documents in "Documents Section South," established in the Munich Archives during the last war for the theaters of war of Italy and Africa are said to have been sent to America by representatives of the U.S. Army.

4. Chief of Army Libraries

After the Army Archives had been placed under the General Staff and had been reorganized, it became necessary to take similar steps in regard to the book and magazine collections. These collections, insofar as they were of a military nature, had to be consolidated like the Army Archives, so that military researchers and history writers could utilize all written and printed sources for their purpose.

General Freiherr Ruedt Von Collenberg was appointed Chief of Army libraries and placed in charge of the book and magazine collections.

This amalgamation proved to be of great use for scientific work, inasmuch as the large military libraries, owing to their historical past, had not previously tried to establish connections with each other and were now for the first time informed as to the extent of each other's collections, and were, as a result, able to fill existing gaps through their mutual efforts. It would have facilitated historical research if the various army libraries had been given a priority to col-

lect documents in certain fields. The idea of doing this had existed at the beginning of World War II. In view of the course taken by the war the idea had to be given up.

During the war the Chief of Army Libraries used methods similar to those used by the Chief of Army Archives to safeguard archives abroad and was just as successful as the latter, in protecting military libraries in the occupied areas. Thus major losses were spared the libraries of the occupied countries, while our own libraries, like the German Archives, were dealt heavy blows by the war.

5. Assistant Chief of Staff for Military History

(Oberquartiermeister V*)

The keystone in the scientific structure erected by the Chief of Staff during the years from 1933 to 1938 was the establishment of the position of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Military History (O.Qu.V).

The latter was to consolidate the various historical installations and spheres of activity and to direct them according to the instructions of the Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff was to be relieved by the Assistant Chief of Staff V of work not concerned with the main mission of the General Staff, since he was constantly in demand for important and pressing current problems.

General Beck was no longer able to take this last organizational step on the road to revival of the old traditions and the proven methods of the General Staff of before World War I. It was one of the first official acts of his successor, General Halder, who, in the fall of 1938, reestablished the position of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Military History, which had last existed in 1914.

* Assistant Chief of Staff V.

General Erfurth, the former chief of the 7th Military Science Branch was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff V. As Assistant Chief of Staff, he retained the editorship of the Review of Military Science. He ran his office with the help of a very small staff and represented the Chief of Staff on public occasions and at meetings of German historians. The efforts of the Assistant Chief of Staff V to stimulate the production and propagation of military-historical works were ably supported by the publishing house of E.S. Mittler & Sohn in Berlin which spared neither trouble nor costs in furthering the aims of the General Staff. Any papers of the historical installations of the General Staff which was intended for publication were given to the head of this publishing house, who handled the work with the greatest of understanding. The great success of the Review of Military Science was attributable to the clever advice of the experienced head of Mittler & Sohn.

In retrospect it may be said that, with regard to the writing of history and to historical research, the General Staff organization had reached a very high level by the beginning of World War II. All justified expectations had been realized, and as a result the organizational requisites were present for completion of unfinished historical studies and to begin new task. In respect to personnel there was still a great lack of military historians in 1939. Their training would have taken a great deal of time and would probably have met with great difficultues, because the writing of military history and the training of historians requires time and conditions favoring undisturbed desk work. In view of the shortness of the time available and the unrest of the day it is not surprising that no more was achieved in the effort to encourage a scholarly bent of mind in the General Staff and in widening the his-

torical knowledge of its officers during the last prewar years. The first fruits of the scientific work were just beginning to ripen when war broke out and destroyed the young shoots of a military historical reconnaissance.

In order to give a complete picture of the intellectual forces which were active in the field of military history in Germany in 1939, it is advisable to mention a few of the organizations and associations with which the General Staff maintained occasional contact.

The first place among these organizations was occupied by the MILITARY ASSOCIATION, Berlin, which was under the official auspices of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Military History. It had been founded in 1803 by Scharnhorst for the purpose of exercising a stimulating effect on the scholarly interests of the officers' corps of the Berlin garrison. The association survived all storms and remained in operation even after 1918. At first it was headed by General Von Altrock, and then by General Hasse. In the course of every winter it held several military-historical lectures. In the Military Association aged members predominated. Retired officers chiefly participated in the lectures. The relationship of the General Staff with the association was chiefly concerned with giving support to the president in his efforts to obtain the services of qualified personalities as lecturers.

A similar task to that assumed by MILITARY ASSOCIATION was pursued by the "Association for Military Policy and Military Science." It was headed by General Von Cochenhausen. The seat of this association was in Berlin, but branches were maintained also in a few other towns, such as Breslau and Vienna. The General Staff maintained only

very loose connections with the ASSOCIATION FOR MILITARY POLICY. It was under the official auspices of the Interior Branch of Wehrmacht High Command.

Aside from lectures for its members the ASSOCIATION FOR MILITARY POLICY was interested in propagating the military sciences which had been developed after 1918, among the universities and colleges and in handling the appointment of instructors in these sciences. The General Staff kept aloof from these efforts, inasmuch as it predicted little benefit from them. These matters were in the hands of the Chief of the Army Ordnance Office, Professor Becker, and his assistant, Professor Schumann.

The growing inclination in Germany to transfer the intellectual equipment of professional soldiership to laymen and to allow a pseudo-soldiership to arise in the various fields of civil life, which was noticeable especially after 1933, was consciously opposed by the General Staff.

Hence even the efforts of Professor RITTER Von NIEDERMAYER, a veteran officer of World War I, who taught geography and geopolitics at the University of Berlin, found no support in the General Staff.

About the beginning of World War II the "National Institute for Modern History," directed by Professor Walter Frank, attempted to establish relations with the General Staff. Even though it was clear that there were not common links between the tasks of the National Institute and those of the General Staff, Professor Frank was not casually dismissed. Since the General Staff lived in constant fear that the National Socialist Party might use the National Institute for Modern

was the only assistant chief of staff remaining in Berlin in September 1939. All the other assistant chiefs of staff followed the Chief of Staff to the war quarters established in Camp ZEPPELIN near Zossen.

The Assistant Chief of Staff V represented the Chief of Staff in Berlin and headed the agencies of the General Staff which had remained in their peacetime quarters in and around Berlin. These were all the offices and installations which already in peacetime had been within the scope of activity of the Assistant Chief of Staff V, and in addition:

The Mapping and Survey Branch
The Photograph and Moving Picture Section of the Army.
The Attache Branch.
The Inspectorate of Army Training (only during the first weeks, then this inspectorate was placed under the Commander of the Replacement Army).

The degree of subordination of the above agencies to the Deputy Chief of Staff was limited only. While after the mobilization of World War I the rear echelon of the General Staff was established in Berlin as an independent office, in World War II the chiefs of staffs retained authority over the work and personnel of their sections having remained in Berlin. The Assistant Chief of Staff V represented the Chief of Staff in case of need according to the instructions received from General Halder. This was particularly true in the case of the Attache Branch which received instructions in regard to its work through the Assistant Chief of Staff IV from Camp ZEPPELIN. But as a rule the Assistant Chief of Staff V usually received the foreign military attaches, who remained in Berlin during the first years of the war, and the foreign military missions who came to Germany in great numbers after the campaigns in Poland and in the West to study modern warfare and the surprising successes of the German Army. The relationship between

the Assistant Chief of Staff V and the foreign officers was restricted to social activities. They received their specialized information and the documentation requested by them from the Assistant Chief of Staff IV or from the Attache Branch.

The active cooperation existing between the Assistant Chief of Staff V and the Interior Section of the Wehrmacht High Command, even in peacetime, continued during the war and was expanded to include the Press and Propaganda Branch then established. The common sphere of activity of these three Agencies was in military censorship, which had to be handled with particular care during the War. Censorship matters were in charge of the Wehrmacht High Command, the Assistant Chief of Staff V merely having the right of inspection.

In addition, Assistant Chief of Staff V, as deputy of the Chief of Staff in Berlin, occasionally needed to establish official contact with the Commander of the Replacement Army.

The Berlin activities of the Assistant Chief of Staff V ended on 12 June 1941. On that day he was informed by General Halder at Camp ZEPPELIN that he was to fly to Helsinki on 13 June and there to represent the German Wehrmacht and the German Army at the Finnish Headquarters as Commander of Liaison Staff NORTH.

No one was reappointed for the position of Assistant Chief of Staff V at that time. It was represented by the Chief of the 7th (Military Science) Branch, General Starke. This situation remained unchanged until spring 1942. Thereupon a complete change in the situation took place as a result of the personal intervention of Hitler. He appointed an "Official Military Historian" without consulting the Chief of Staff

and put him in charge of the whole sphere of activity of the Assistant Chief of Staff V, which at the same time removed this sphere of activity from the General Staff. This was something that had never happened before in the history of the Prussian-German General Staff. It was completely unheard of. The level of the historical work, organized by Generals Beck and Halder between 1933 and 1938, now declined and deteriorated very fast. Their creation, which was based on the traditions of the old General Staff, and which had gained a high reputation in all military science circles during the few years of its existence, soon lost in importance owing to interference in the selection of personnel and the lack of professional aptitude of the man in charge and ended miserably in the general collapse.

The FUEHRER'S OFFICIAL MILITARY HISTORIAN, who recognized too late the harm he had caused, ended by suicide.

/s/ (Waldemar ERFURTH)

Organization of the Office Assistant Chief of Staff V (O.Qu.V) as of 1 September 1939

Military Science Branch

Editorial Staff of the Review of Military Science

Military History Research Institute of the Army

Chief of Army Archives

In charge of the following:

Army Archives

- Potsdam
- Munich
- Stuttgart
- Dresden
- Vienna
- Prague

Army Archives
- Danzig

Representatives of the Archives in
- Paris*
- Brussels*
- The Hague*

Chief of Army Libraries

Army Libraries:

- Berlin
- Vienna
- Prague

Military district libraries at the military area headquarters.

Military post libraries (officers libraries)

Enlisted men's libraries with troop units.

Army Magazine Branch**

* Established in 1940

** Was placed under the Chief of Army Libraries some time after 1 Sep 1939.

German Army High Command as a Part of the Wehrmacht

Command

The Field Command Office

Section 2: MISSIONS AND WORK METHODS OF THE LEADING AGENCIES

h. CHIEF OF ARMY SUPPLY AND ADMIN-

ISTRATION

will be treated under Section 9:

ORGANIZATION, WORK METHODS AND

INFLUENCE EXERTED BY CHIEF OF ARMY

SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION DURING

THE WAR 1939 - 1945.

MS # P-041d

OKH Project # 7

CONTROL OF THE GERMAN ARMY GENERAL STAFF

CHAPTER VIII

by

Franz Halder, Generaloberst a.D.

Translator: H.F.Baerwaldt
Editor : Capt N.T. Walker
Reviewer : Capt N.T. Walker

Historical Division
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
1952

Franz HALDER
Generaloberst a.D.
Date of Birth: 30 June 1884
Place of Birth: Wuerzburg, Germany

From training in the Royal Bavarian Officer Candidate School, the Royal Bavarian Artillery School, and the Royal Bavarian War College, HALDER throughout World War I served on various staffs from division to army group level.

From 1936 until 1938 he held high assignments in Army High Command. After a brief tour as Chief of Operations Staff, he was appointed Chief of Army General Staff on 27 August 1938 when Generaloberst Ludwig BECK resigned from that position in protest against HITLER's obvious intention to wage war. In the same year he was promoted from Generalleutnant to General der Artillerie and in 1940 to Generaloberst.

Owing to continuous differences of opinion on matters of strategy and ethics, and because of alleged obstructionism, HITLER removed Generaloberst HALDER from his post as Chief of Army General Staff in September 1942 and placed him in the Army High Command Officer Reserve.

On 21 July 1944, the day after the attempt on HITLER's life, HALDER was arrested by the Gestapo and spent the rest of the war in various prisons and concentration camps. While held in custody HALDER was retired from the Army on 31 January 1945.

In addition to being responsible for the operations of the General Staff at the Army High Command in peacetime and of its Field Headquarters (advanced echelon) during war, an essential mission of the Chief of the Army General Staff in both peace and war was that of supervision of the entire General Staff Corps. This responsibility included the selection and training of General Staff replacements, the continued education and training of General Staff officers of all ranks, and the personnel policy of the General Staff Corps.

In peacetime all officers of the Army were given a "Wehrkreis* Examination" after about ten years of service with troops. These examinations indicated the status of the military and general education of the officers being examined, and were a basis for selecting officers for a General Staff or other special career, because their military knowledge and judgment distinguished them from their colleagues.

The Wehrkreis examination took place in February or March of each year and was given to officers who had been selected in the previous summer according to age. During the winter, these officers prepared for the examination by attending lectures, writing compositions, undergoing map training, participating in map maneuvers, and holding discussions which were conducted under the supervision of the Chiefs of Staff of the various Wehrkreise. The examination covered tactics, weapons, engineer service, and both army-wide and specific branch problems. In the non-military fields, it covered constitutional law,

* The basic German military area, somewhat similar to the pre-war Corps Area in the United States.

history, geography, languages, and so forth. The grade of each examinee was determined by a point system which was weighted in accordance with the military importance of each field.

Officers selected for special training on the basis of their grade could choose between attending the Kriegsakademie* or receiving special technical training. Before being assigned to the Kriegsakademie, a special report on each officer was requested from their former superiors by the Army High Command. These reports covered the personality, characteristics, disposition, and performance of troop duties of the officer concerned and contained a recommendation whether the officer was or was not suited by personality and talent for the General Staff. Thus the field units had a voice in the selection of candidates for a General Staff career.

The fundamental military education for General Staff duty was given at the Kriegsakademie to which officers were generally detached during the year of their Wehrkreis examination. The instructional staff of the Kriegsakademie was carefully selected by the Chief of the General Staff himself, on the basis of the personal suitability and military knowledge of the individual instructors. The curriculum introduced the student to the military, military-historical, and military-technical knowledge which was necessary for troop command up to divisional size, and it broadened his general education by courses in history, constitutional law, economics and so forth.

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* War College

On the basis of pre-World War I, peacetime experience, three years were required for training at the Kriegsakademie, but with the expansion of the army the need for General Staff officers became so acute that the training period had to be reduced to two years. Before the first year and between terms, the General Staff candidates were detailed to other branches in order to familiarize themselves with the characteristics of all arms in the divisional structure.

While at the Kriegsakademie and on detached service, the applicants were constantly given detailed examination to evaluate dispositions and personalities. These examinations were considered in the final evaluation of the officer by the Kriegsakademie, which was primarily based on the character, disposition, and physical and intellectual abilities of the candidate. The degree of his practical knowledge was of secondary importance, while his theoretical knowledge was least significant. The final evaluation, however, could only take the form of one of two recommendations: either the candidate was or was not suited for General Staff duty or conditionally suited for General Staff duty (e.g. after the removal of existing defects).

Largely on the basis of this recommendation, final selection of the officers, who were apparently suited for further training and General Staff duty, was made by the Chief of the Army General Staff. The majority of those selected were attached to the Army High Command itself or to other High Command Offices for duty in order to provide on-the-job General Staff training with close concurrent supervision. This practical training and probationary period lasted about one year and included several additional

examinations. After the completion of this period, the officer was assigned to the General Staff and became entitled to wear the General Staff uniform.

Hence the training period of the General Staff applicant was not only a period of professional advancement in theoretical knowledge and practical skill, but was also one of constant selection based primarily on personality and character traits. As long as this selection system was not disturbed, General Staff replacements could rightfully be considered selections from the best of their age class.

However, the actual training and education which enabled the German General Staff officer to accomplish his generally recognized superior performance of duty took place through practical duty itself after his transfer to the General Staff. Constant, immediate cooperation with older and more experienced military experts, frequent changes in duty assignments to provide broad perspectives of General Staff duty, contact with troops of all branches, and continuous training in troop command and General Staff technique all contributed to his development.

The Chief of the Army General Staff was responsible for the military education of the General Staff officers, but in the Army High Command this responsibility was delegated to the Chief of Schools and Training and in the troop staffs to the Wehrkreis Chief of Staff (Military Area Headquarters). General directives and annual training instructions from the Chief of the Army General Staff were the bases for uniform General Staff training in the army. The development of the personality continued

to be a major factor in evaluating General Staff officers who were rated annually, while troop officers were rated every second year. In addition to the rating by their immediate superiors, General Staff officers were rated by the Wehrkreis Chief of Staff (Military Area Headquarters). General Staff officers made annual General Staff training tours, which were conducted within the corps, the army group, and the Army High Command, and they were again rated by the commander of the tour.

Thus the Central Branch of the General Staff of the Army High Command obtained a clear picture of every General Staff officer with regard to his personality, characteristics, disposition, intellectual talents, and special skills. Officers who fell short of the standard, especially those who showed traits of selfishness and ambition, were sent back to the troops.

Particular value was attached to a gradual transition from troop duty to General Staff duty. As in the old Imperial Army, it was considered desirable that the General Staff officer's duty during this period should be about equally divided between the troops and the General Staff. But the constant shortage of General Staff officers resulting from the expansion of the army did not permit this goal to be attained and most of the General Staff officers who wanted troop duty had to be content with occasional short tours or sometimes only with temporary duty. Since in general no disadvantage resulted from this condition, it is evident that the selection system for General Staff replacements succeeded in choosing really superior troop officers for the General Staff who were well grounded in troop duty.

Assignment of General Staff officers to the various sections of the

General Staff depended on their individual suitability and disposition. By increasing their experience in a special field such as command, supply, intelligence, and so forth and by able performance of duty, they advanced to high General Staff positions in their fields. Those officers who combined mastery of a special field with sound judgment in all other fields and with a strong personality were suited for the chief positions.

The selection of chiefs of General Staff, Army Groups, Armies, Corps, and other high offices on the one hand and of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff and section chiefs in the General Staff of the Army High Command on the other hand was a duty of the Chief of the Army General Staff. During training tours, conferences, and other official events, he had ample opportunity to learn to know outstanding officers personally. The General Staff officers occupying chief positions were the agencies of the Chief of the Army General Staff and under his influence they educated, trained, and constantly supervised the General Staff cadre. Thus the uniformity of the German General Staff was protected as long as overriding outside influences did not intrude.

War is the primary, practical test of the General Staff, and it made the expansion of the size of the General Staff cadre while maintaining its high quality a particularly serious duty of the Chief of the Army General Staff. The Kriegsakademie was closed at the beginning of the war, not because the command reckoned with a short war, as is presumed in later chapters of the study on the Army High Command, but because the instructors were needed for important command positions as a result of the shortage

of General Staff officers. It was the intention from the beginning, because of the expected long duration of the war, to resume the training of General Staff replacements as soon as possible and in a form geared to the conditions of war.

The most difficult problem during the war was estimating the number of officers required for General Staff duty, and the method of their selection from the field units which were themselves suffering from a lack of officers. The outbreak of war found the German army in a stage of development and struggling under all the inadequacies and gaps connected with such a situation. As little as the army was prepared for war in strength, organization, and equipment, it was even less prepared with regard to the number in the General Staff. It was confronted with personnel requirements, which it could not meet, for the formation of numerous mobile staffs, and the problem of replacements had to be met by stopgap auxiliary measures.

Two expedients to solve these urgent questions were used at the beginning of the war. Experienced General Staff officers of World War I were drafted for war duty, and, after short instructional courses, were placed in positions which had no immediate connection with troop command and whose requirements could be met on the basis of general military experience. Thus younger General Staff officers were made available for assigmments at the front. In addition, numerous General Staff positions on the Tables of Organization were filled by officers including reserve officers, who had not received even fundamental General Staff training.

The opinions on these expedients were not uniform within the General Staff as is apparent in the chapters of the study on the Army High Command. The Intelligence Sections especially seemed to find it necessary to demand completely trained General Staff officers, even though the experiences of World War I had proved that intellectually active, logically thinking, and worldly wise men of all professional groups can accomplish excellent results in this field. Experienced men from civil life can similarly be used with advantage in troop supply work. Hence this expedient was no great loss, even though it may have produced a few inconveniences at the beginning. Of course, officers selected for such General Staff positions were specially prepared for their assignments, and the training of replacements for technical General Staff work was continued.

Completely different methods from those prevailing in peacetime had to be adopted for the selection of General Staff replacements during the war, but the principle remained of basic selection by the troops themselves. Further selection from this group and the training of those selected, was handled by the General Staff. The former principle that the personality, characteristics and disposition were decisive in this selection remained unchanged, but in wartime, of course, the essential point is added of having proved oneself before the enemy and in time this became the prerequisite for being suggested.

Based on these considerations, a system developed via a few intermediate steps, whereby the field units suggested young officers for General Staff training within certain annually announced age limits. This selection

was made on the principle that the field units would be responsible that no officer entered the General Staff who would not be fully acceptable to them in that capacity. Most of the officers suggested were experienced adjutants and special-missions staff officers who knew the war time needs of the troops from their own experience.

After being selected, the officers were relieved according to a plan issued by the Army High Command and were assigned for combat duty during the first half of the year with branches in which they had not previously served. The Army High Command recognized the risk of these measures, and many promising officers were killed in battle during this tour. But the leading concept of General Staff duty, that of service to the troops, overcame the hesitation. During the second half of the preparation year, the selected officers were detailed for duty with the operations staffs of divisions, corps, and armies in order to become familiar with the mechanism of troop command.

Thus it was possible to restrict the theoretical education to a few months under specially selected, battle-experienced General Staff officers. Later, as the level of formal education of the replacement age classes became lower and lower, this period was raised to half a year. Because the General Staff applicants entered the Kriegsakademie with vivid ideas based on their own experience as to the command mechanism and the living conditions of the fighting troops, the theoretical education had a much sounder foundation than in peacetime. In addition, training in wartime essentially was restricted to the fields of troop command within the

structure of a division, although infantry, panzer, and motorized divisions were covered equally so as not to restrict the utility of the trained officers. Even though valuable young officers were continually withdrawn from the field units through this procedure, the troops were satisfied with it and with its results.

The further education and training of General Staff officers during the war took place under the direction of the Chief of the Army General Staff through the General Staff chiefs of the corps and armies on the same principles as in peacetime. Its effectiveness naturally suffered because the frequent turnover of their subordinates made it difficult for the corps and army chiefs of staff to thoroughly investigate the personalities of the officers under their command. In addition, the increasing youth of the officer cadre due to casualties was felt even in the General Staff.

It was inevitable that the quality of the General Staff lowered gradually in the course of the long war years just as it did with the entire officer cadre. There is probably no effective remedy for this decay in any long war.

Also, the progressive decline of the position of the General Staff was not without influence on its quality. With the resignation of the Army Commander-in-Chief and the replacement of the Chief of the General Staff, the attitude of Hitler, who became the Army Commander-in-Chief, constantly grew more strongly opposed to that of the General Staff. Under von Brauchitsch the position of Chief of the General Staff had still permitted the education of the General Staff and its replacements in the spirit of

the old German soldierly traditions. However, as Hitler's direct influence on the Army increased, the position of the General Staff declined rapidly to that of an operations bureau for the Eastern Theater of War. Finally the Chief of the General Staff was deprived of his strongest instrument for influencing and educating General Staff officers through the loss of his immediate influence over General Staff personnel.

When the Chief of the Army General Staff had responsibility for the personnel policy of the entire General Staff (even though changes in personnel were formally announced by the Army Commander in Chief through the Army Personnel Office), it had been guided by two basic principles. The first of these was to provide valuable assistants for the troop commanders who were suited for their duties by personality, military skill, devotion to the ideal of service to the troops, and determination to achieve success in their operations. The second principle was to guarantee uniformity in the General Staff cadre in regard to the interpretation of its professional missions and the management of its duties.

It was particularly important that the selection of chiefs of staff for army groups and armies was most carefully adjusted to the personality of the responsible commander in chief. Thus temperamental and willful troop commanders were provided strong but quiet and deliberate personalities while troop commanders inclined to doubt and hesitation were given daring and energetic chiefs of staff. The necessity to counterbalance inadequate military skill on the part of high commanders through the selection of chiefs of staff was not pronounced during peacetime

and the early years of the war, since the high commander cadre from the 100,000 Man Army had an excellent measure of military skill and experience. But during the later years of the war, when the old military experts were removed, men who enjoyed the political confidence of Hitler but who lacked the appropriate professional equipment began to occupy the leading high command positions.

The high level troop commanders were generally not consulted when their Chiefs of Staff were appointed. The personalities of the officers from the 100,000-man Army - only such were generally considered - and their personal relations with one another were known to the Army High Command, so that mistakes could be avoided. However, frictions and differences of opinion between the commander and the chief of staff frequently arose as a result of the enormous nervous strain prevailing at high command offices. If these threatened to endanger the unity of the command, and the uniform conduct of operations then the Chief of the Army General Staff appointed a new chief of staff. This practice also applied in the case of divisional operations officers because the troop commander carried sole responsibility for command. However, cases of replacement under these circumstances were very rare during the early stages of the war.

General Staff duty assignments were made by the Army High Command along certain well-defined lines. In order that each young General Staff officer might first prove himself in the field of troop welfare, his first assignment was generally in supply and administration within the division. Later he would serve as operations officer in a division, and on the basis

of his performance in these positions and the special abilities and inclinations which he displayed, it was determined whether he would serve in tactical command, troop supply (quartermaster duty), intelligence or in such fields as organization, training, transportation, and so forth. Officers who showed early promise in operations problems were watched very closely and were assigned to operative command staffs (army, army group, Army High Command) after their duty with the troops.

The goal of General Staff technical training is all around General Staff officers who are competent in all phases of General Staff work. It is questionable whether this goal can still be reached in light of today's increasing specialization. In the 100,000-man Army this goal was nearly attained but with the rapid expansion of the Army and consequent shortage of General Staff officers, it became increasingly difficult to approach. Consequently a division of the General Staff cadre into the various fields was more and more apparent in the personnel policy of the General Staff.

The Chief of the Army General Staff devoted special attention to the selection of General Staff officers to be instructors at the Kriegsakademie and in the General Staff courses. Assignment to this duty was an expression of personal confidence in the ability of the officer by the Chief of the General Staff, because he transmitted his opinion on General Staff missions and duties to the replacements through their instructors.

Responsibility of the Chief of the Army General Staff for personnel administration covered all officers on the General Staff list, which contained all General Staff officers from their assignment until their

cancellation from this service. Hence they remained on this list even during periods of service with troops, if the Chief of the General Staff did not positively renounce their further General Staff employment. Such renunciation was generally made only if the General Staff officer concerned was definitely not suited for further General Staff service (independent from rank and years in the service), or when he had reached such an age that he could only be used for a high command position.

The duty of the Chief of the General Staff to guarantee uniformity in the General Staff handling of its professional functions was discharged by personally and carefully supervising the uniformity of all regulations and directives serving as a basis for General Staff training (in peacetime he was assisted in this duty by the Deputy Chief of Staff II, in wartime by the Training Branch of the Replacement Training Army), and by supplementing them through uniform evaluation of war experiences. This basis was further supplemented by a constant exchange of ideas between the Army High Command and General Staff officers occupying chief positions. The latter in turn influenced the General Staff officers of subordinate units as to uniform interpretation and thus became mediators between the Chief of the General Staff and the corpus of the General Staff officers. In order to maintain personal contact with the Chief of the Army General Staff all General Staff officers,in chief positions had to report to him personally when coming to headquarters or to a place in its vicinity. Inasmuch as the responsibility of command was not lodged with the General Staff officers but solely with the commander, a uniform system of advising

commanders was accomplished, and this proved to be sufficient for securing uniformity of command in the Army.

One of the most important duties of the Chief of the Army General Staff was the education of the General Staff officers regarding uniform interpretation of the General Staff mission. In this respect the personnel policy of the Chief of the General Staff and the utilization of officers in chief positions as bearers and proponents of the ideals was very effective.

The duties of the General Staff do not differ essentially in large armies with regard to military matters. The special character of the German General Staff was based on the fact that, beyond the military problems, it aimed at being not only a selection of the best-trained soldiers, but also of the most valuable and capable personalities of the Army as a whole. This elite had the mission of influencing the entire officer corps of the Army from the lofty professional and ethical standards of Moltke. They were to be living examples of unselfish devotion to the military profession, of strictest self-discipline, and of constant effort toward self-improvement.

Thus the German General Staff gained the character of a society reaching far beyond the limits of purely professional matters which caused it to differ from the general staffs of other armies. It not only sought to be a command office of the highest military value and the brains of the German army, but also its heart and conscience. That this very high goal

could not be completely reached is clear because of the inadequacies of human nature, but in the period after World War I, during which it had freedom of action in the selection and education of General Staff officers, it was nevertheless able to come very close to it.

In this effort it clearly and distinctly refrained from falling into the tendency toward arrogance and toward striving for power which had begun to make itself felt in the General Staff of the Imperial Era. The return to Moltke's ideals also removed the "General Staff's sharing in the responsibility of command" which had started under Ludendorf. This took place in autumn 1938 and was announced in the new edition of the "Handbook for General Staff Duty during War" (HDv.g.92) which was published in August 1939. Thus the General Staff again became that which Moltke had meant it to be, an unselfish servant of command and troops.

In order to influence the entire Army with its spirit and its concept of its profession, the General Staff had to be represented at all points of importance in the formation and development of the Army. Therefore, General Staff officers were attached to such offices whenever possible. As a result, young General Staff officers often found themselves fighting for and proclaiming Moltke's ideals in a forlorn post within the structure of other offices.

This was not always understood and was opposed as an attempt to expand the power of the General Staff. It was necessary for the Chief of the Army General Staff to carefully but persistently fight this battle with the assistance of the Chief of the Central Section of the General Staff

and the Deputy Chiefs of Staff of the Army General Staff. This struggle had not been concluded by the beginning of the war, but the events of the war caused it to recede into the background. Nevertheless the fact that it had not been forgotten is proved by a memorandum on the missions and education of the General Staff in peacetime which was prepared by the Chief of the Army General Staff at Fontainebleau after the armistice with France. Unfortunately this draft seems to have been lost.

The effect of the policy of the Chief of the Army General Staff in the selection of General Staff replacements and in the education and training of the General Staff was felt far beyond the General Staff cadre itself. The advance of General Staff officers to higher ranks as a result of constant military and personal development was a natural consequence of this selection, and they constituted the main, sometimes even the almost exclusive, replacement pool for high command positions. Thus the General Staff personnel policy had an effect on the highest command circles which was decisive for the performance of the entire Army even though it was not felt immediately.

The representation of interests of the General Staff in the fields of promotion and decoration was another function of the Chief of the Army General Staff. In order to utilize the careful and expensive training of the General Staff officer in influential positions while his military skill and his personality could still exert an influence, General Staff officers were granted a two year advancement on the Seniority list after their transfer to the General Staff. Additional but comparatively unimportant commission

improvements were also possible for older General Staff officers when transferred to chief positions, a measure which was common in the Imperial Army.

These measures were maintained in spite of Hilter's attempts to place the troop officer above the General Staff officer in every respect, but in the field of decoration for meritorious service, his resistance could not be broken. In general, officers who distinguished themselves in General Staff positions could only receive such decorations as received slight recognition from the troops.

This disregard of and open belittlement of the performance of the General Staff by the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht did not facilitate the efforts of the Chief of the General Staff to maintain zeal for their duty and enthusiasm for their profession on the part of the General Staff officers. If he succeeded in spite of these obstacles in maintaining the devoted and unselfish spirit of the General Staff at its full height during the time in which one could still speak of a uniform and regular command of the General Staff, it is the best proof that Moltke's spirit was active within the German General Staff.

/s/ Franz Halder